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I. INTRODUCTION 
When a Minnesotan is convicted of a crime, that individual is subject 
to the direct and collateral effects of a conviction. But, unfortunately, many 
are surprised to learn that when an individual is arrested and the case is 
neither charged, nor dismissed, nor results in a not guilty adjudication, the 
arrest record is neither discarded nor sealed,! Anyone can access that infor-
mation for many years.2 And, many people, in fact, use this information to 
make determinations for employment and housing. Others make the per-
son's arrest known to the community.3 And, if there is a resolution in favor 
of the defendant, the resolution is often unreported. Unless the individual-
who is the subject of the arrest record-takes immediate action, that person 
will be in danger of being denied employment, housing, or worse, having 
his or her record made publicly available. 
1. See CriMNet Program Office, BACKGROUND CHECKS AND EXPUNGEMENTS - RESEARCH 
REPORT 87 (2006), http://www.crimnet.state.mn.uslProjectsIBGchecks.htm (follow "Research 
Report on Background Checks and Expungements (October 2006)" hyperlink) [hereinafter 
CriMNet, BACKGROUND CHECKS] ("When arrested, some people are most concerned about going 
home, keeping the kids, and not going to jail because they would lose their jobs. They're told it's 
'dismissed' .... But it's guilt, with many consequences. People aren't informed and don't 
understand."). 
2. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 13.82(2) (West 2007) (Arrest data "shall be public at all times in 
the originating agency."); see, e.g., Gregg E. Johnson, Dist. Ct. Judge, Ramsey County Courtroom 
Address: Consideration of Executive Agency Inherent Power Expungement (Oct. 18, 2006) 
(describing how a defendant who petitioned for expungement explained that an arrest put on her 
record in 1979-ultimately dismissed by the prosecutor-still prevented her from obtaining de-
cent employment and housing). 
3. See In re Quinn, 517 N.W.2d 895, 898 (Minn. 1994) (discussing that the public (and 
thus, the media) is entitled under the Government Data Practices Act to access to law enforcement 
records). 
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Collateral effects are invisible,4 civil punishments5 attached to any 
crime.6 Collateral effects arise immediately following an arrest.? In the past, 
the public could not easily access criminal history records-remedies cur-
tailing their availability were not compelling. 8 Today, technology has 
greatly increased the public's accessibility to criminal records.9 Employers, 
landlords, media,lO data harvesters 11 and any member of the public,12 have 
access to almost every single arrest record. The only protected arrest 
records are those that are sealed and/or removed completely. 
4. Jeremy Travis, Invisible Punishment: An Instrument of Social Exclusion, in INVISIBLE 
PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 15, 15-16 (Marc Mauer 
& Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002) 
Not all criminal sanctions are as visible as prisons: We punish people in other, less 
tangible ways .... This form of punishment is not as obvious to the public .... [A] 
criminal sanction that is nearly invisible ... [is] the punishment that is accomplished 
through the diminution of the rights and privileges of citizenship and legal residency in 
the [U.S.]. ... Because these laws operate largely beyond public view, yet have very 
serious, adverse consequences for the individuals affected, [they are] 'invisible 
punishment. ' 
5. Id. at 16 ("Through judicial interpretation ... these forms of punishment have been 
defined as 'civil' rather than criminal in nature .... "). 
6. Shawn D. Stuckey, Comment, Decreasing the Accessibility to Criminal History Records 
to Diminish the Devastating Impacts of Collateral Effects on African Americans in Minnesota, 27 
CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. (Feb. 2008) (manuscript at 1); see Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. 
Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL 
L. REv. 697, 700 (2002) ("Collateral consequences can operate as a secret sentence."); A.B.A., 
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICA-
TION OF CONVICTED PERSONS, Standard 19-1.1(a) (3d ed. 2003), http://www.abanet.org/crimjust! 
standards/collateraUoc.html (follow "Standard 19-1.1(a)" hyperlink); see generally Rodney J. 
Uphoff, The Criminal Defense Lawyer as Effective Negotiator: A Systemic Approach, 2 CLINICAL 
L. REV. 73, 100-01 (1995) (noting that collateral effects may be worse than sentences). 
7. Stuckey, supra note 6, (manuscript at 1); see Tom Johnson, President, Council of Crime 
and Justice, Why Arrest Legislation Should Be Approved in Minnesota, Lecture for Council on 
Crime and Justice (Nov. 22, 2006) ("Most people either discuss the consequences of arrest or the 
consequences of conviction. Although the consequences of conviction are worse than the conse-
quences of arrest, the two should be considered together."). 
8. Stuckey, supra note 6, (manuscript at 3). See generally CriMNet, EXPUNGEMENTS SUB-
TEAM: MEETING MINUTES 4 (Aug. 11, 2006), http://www.crimnet.state.mn.us/Governance/Task 
ForceMinsAgendas.htm (follow "Minutes" hyperlink beside the meeting date "8/11/06") (noting 
that the current expungement statute is narrow and not very helpful to many because it was imple-
mented before widespread electronic distribution); CriMNet, BACKGROUND CHECKS, supra note 1, 
at 79 (finding that in 2000,318 people were granted expungements and in 2005, the number rose 
to 1,295). 
9. Stuckey, supra note 6, (manuscript at 3); see Jon Bonne, Most Firms Now Use Back-
ground Checks: Survey; 8 in 10 Probe Criminal History Amid Security Worries, MSNBC, Jan. 21, 
2004, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4018280/ ("Most companies now conduct criminal back-
ground checks on potential employees .... A sharp increase in this practice ... reflects ... the 
growing public availability of personal information."); CriMNet, BACKGROUND CHECKS, supra 
note 1, at 79. 
10. See Quinn, 517 N.W.2d at 898. 
11. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 13.82; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 15.162 (West 2007). 
12. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 13.82(16); see also Quinn, 517 N.W.2d at 898 (finding that an 
aggtieved person may claim a protectable interest in the information of an arrested individual). 
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This Comment explores the collateral effects of arrests that directly 
impact Minnesotans. The Comment discusses all arrests but will specifi-
cally focus on those that do not result in conviction. Section II explains how 
low-income citizens and minorities are particularly susceptible to the crea-
tion of arrest records. I then discuss how particular police policies subject 
individuals to criminal records by arresting and releasing them without 
prosecution. Section III discusses how arrest information in Minnesota is 
easily accessible to the public after it is gathered and stored. Section IV 
concerns the collateral effects of arrests and various pieces of legislation 
that have been introduced to address this issue. Section V discusses relevant 
legislative matters. Section VI offers advice for protecting personal data. 
Finally, section VII provides recommendations to guide the public, commu-
nity activists, legislators, and the judiciary and facilitate change in how ar-
rest information not resulting in convictions is used in Minnesota; the 
suggestions include a little-known option that allows such individuals to 
quickly and easily alleviate the negative consequences of collateral effects. 
II. THE IMPACT OF COLLATERAL EFFECTS ON Low-INCOME AND 
MINORITY CITIZENS AND RELATED PROBLEMS 
WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT POLICIES 
Although collateral effects of arrests provide negative consequences 
for all Minnesota residents, the consequences are particularly dangerous for 
low-income individuals and disadvantaged minorities, specifically African 
Americans. Studies have repeatedly shown that African Americans are po-
liced, prosecuted and sentenced at rates greatly disproportionate to their 
numbers in society.13 A major source of this problem is that African Ameri-
cans are more often arrested and prosecuted for low-level offenses-such as 
petty misdemeanors and misdemeanors-than Caucasians; these arrests 
usually occur in poorer and predominately African American neighbor-
hoods.14 Nationally, African Americans are arrested at rates almost three 
times their percentage of the population. 15 Despite comprising 12 to 13 per-
cent of the United States' population, African Americans "account for more 
than 30 percent of all arrests."16 For felony-level crimes, minorities are 
13. See Lenese C. Herbert, Bete Noire: How Race-Based Policing Threatens National Secur-
ity, 9 MICH. J. RACE & L. 149,205 n.341 (2003) (citing KATHERYN K. RUSSELL, THE COLOR OF 
CRIME: RACIAL HOAXES, WHITE FEAR, BLACK PROTECTIONISM, POLICE HARASSMENT, AND OTHER 
MACROAGGRESSIONS 29 (1998». 
14. See generally Thomas L. Johnson & Cheryl Widder Heilman, An Embarrassment to All 
Minnesotans: Racial Disparity in the Criminal Justice System, BENCH & BAR OF MINN., May/June 
2001, http://www2.mnbar.org/benchandbar/2001lmay-junOllracial-disparity.htm (last visited Feb. 
17, 2008); Alan Page, Assoc. J. of Minn. S. Ct., Bias in the Courts?, Address at the Eighth Circuit 
Judicial Conference (July 17,2003), available at http://www.courts.state.mn.us/districtlOl?page= 
NewsltemDisplay&item=20243. 
15. Herbert, supra note 13, at 205 n.341. 
16. [d. 
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seven times more likely to be arrested than whitesY Many of these arrests 
result in cases being dismissed or not charged at all. 18 At every level of law 
enforcement-the police, prosecuting agencies and courts-a paper and 
electronic record is created and passed on to the next level. Often, the report 
of the favorable termination does not follow. 
In Minnesota, the story is embarrassing. 19 The arrest rate in Minnesota 
for African Americans compared to Caucasians is ten to one-more than 
twice the national average?O For some low-level crimes, African Americans 
are 21 times more likely to be arrested than a Caucasian person?1 In 2000 
alone, the State arrested almost half of all African American males between 
the ages of 18 and 30 residing in Hennepin County, Minnesota.22 In 2006, a 
sampling of 168 defendants arrested in Minneapolis for low-level offenses 
showed that 133 (or 80 percent) of the defendants were African Ameri-
can.23 Although many arguments may be made against the legitimacy of 
some of these arrests, the arrest records alone create criminal records for 
these individuals. Unfortunately, the criminal record remains available to 
the public for many years. Fortunately, options are available to one who 
wishes to permanently remove his or her information from the public's ac-
cessibility, which are discussed ~ater in this Comment.24 
"Zero tolerance" policing is a model which began in California, be-
came popularized during former Mayor Rudy Giuliani's tenure in New 
York and has been adopted by many police agencies around the country, 
including in Minnesota.25 "Zero tolerance" policing essentially means that 
17. Johnson & Heilman, supra note 14, at What Do We Know?: Arrests. 
18. See, e.g., id., at What Do We Know?: Prosecutions. 
19. See generally Page, supra note 14 (noting that compared with Caucasians, African Amer-
icans are "aITested more often, charged more often, given higher bails, tougher plea bargains, less 
fair trials, and far longer sentences .... [and are] under-represented in justice system jobs") (quot-
ing MINN. SUP. CT. TASK FORCE, ON RACIAL BIAS IN THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM (May 1993), available 
at http://archive.leg.state.mn.us/docs/pre2003/mandated/930387.pdf). 
20. Stuckey, supra note 6, (manuscript at 14); COUNCIL ON CRIME & JUSTICE, REDUCING 
RACIAL DISPARITY WHILE ENHANCING PUBLIC SAFETY 5, available at http://www.racialdisparity. 
org/reports_finaUeport.php (follow "READ THE FINAL REPORT" hyperlink) [hereinafter 
COUNCIL ON CRIME & JUSTICE, RACIAL DISPARITY]. 
21. See generally Johnson & Heilman, supra note 14, at What Do We Know?: Arrests. 
22. Stuckey, supra note 6, (manuscript at 14); COUNCIL ON CRIME & JUSTICE, FINAL DRAFT 
RESOLUTION LANGUAGE? (2006) (on file with author) ("WHEREAS, In ... 2000, [44 percent] of 
African American males between the ages of eighteen and thirty and residing in Hennepin County 
were arrested and booked in that year alone."). 
23. E-mail attachment from Guy Gambill, Advocacy Coordinator, Council on Crime & Jus-
tice, to author (Apr. 13,2007,03:58 CST) (on file with author). Accord e-mail from Guy Gambill, 
Advocacy Coordinator, Council on Crime & Justice, to author (Apr. 5,2007, 10:08 CST) (on file 
with author). 
24. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 299C.ll(I)(b) (West 2007) (stating that if a person is arrested 
but not charged, she may have her arrest records returned and, when applicable, other identifica-
tion data, simply upon request). 
25. See generally Partners in Justice: A Colloquium on Developing Collaborations Among 
Courts, Law School Clinical Programs and the Practicing Bar, 30 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. 
CHANGE 739, 748 (2006) [hereinafter Partners in Justice]; COUNCIL ON CRIME & JUSTICE, RACIAL 
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police officers crack down on small crimes with the purpose of deterring 
more serious violations. For example, "zero tolerance" policing would call 
for arresting someone for loitering with the hope that the individual will 
either not be on the street to commit a more serious crime or will somehow 
be dissuaded from future criminal activity. Police officers might defend 
"zero tolerance" policing, and other similar arrest and deterrence policies 
around the country, by showing the vast numbers of arrests that are made-
even though many of the arrests are for very low-level offenses. These low-
level offenses enhance the seriousness of later charges and penalties, which 
lead individuals to public dependence and further crime; the obvious effect 
of this policing model is to place more individuals in jeopardy of being 
subject to the collateral effects of arrest records. 
Police in Minneapolis, Minnesota, for example, use a system called 
CODEFOR26 to place officers in "hot spotS."27 As one government official 
noted, "When you want to catch fish, you go where the fishing is easiest."28 
These "hot spots" are historically high crime areas, usually located in low-
income, minority neighborhoods.29 The results of these policies present an 
"embarrassing" racial disparity. 30 
In Minneapolis, African Americans are 35 times more likely to be 
arrested for providing false information and 27 times more likely 
to be arrested for lurking. African Americans are also 19 times 
more likely to be arrested for trespassing and 10 times more likely 
to be arrested for disorderly conduct than whites.31 
DISPARITY, supra note 20, at 6-7 ("CODEFOR is the primary strategy used by the Minneapolis 
Police Department (MPD) to identify and respond to reported crime, with traffic law enforcement 
stops being used as the primary crime reduction tactic for a wide range of 'hot spots'"located in 
primarily African American and lower income neighborhoods); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social 
and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 
1280 (2004) ("The disproportionate incarceration of African Americans results more from sys-
temic factors, such as law enforcement priorities and sentencing legislation, than from biased 
decisionmaking in individual cases."). 
26. COUNCIL ON CRIME & JUSTICE, RACIAL DISPARITY, supra note 20, at 6. 
27. Stuckey, supra note 6, (manuscript at 15); see COUNCIL ON CRIME & JUSTICE, RACIAL 
DISPARITY, supra note 20, at 6-7 (noting that CODEFOR places a high police presence in African 
American neighborhoods); CriMNet, BACKGROUND CHECKS, supra note I, at 83 ("Some jurisdic-
tions use arrest 'sweeps' to maintain order and prevent crime. Even for people who are arrested 
but never charged or convicted, the record of arrest is public data and shows on some criminal 
background checks. Arrestees would have an interest in expunging their arrest records."). 
28. David T. Courtwright, The Drug War's Hidden Toll, ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH. 5 (1996/ 
1997), available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3622/is_199601/ai_n8738302/pg_5. 
29. Stuckey, supra note 6, (manuscript at 15). 
30. See Johnson & Heilman, supra note 14. 
31. Id. at What Do We Know?: Arrests. 
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Minnesota is one of the nation's leaders in disproportionate arrest rates 
for African Americans32 and disparity of incarceration rates for African 
Americans.33 
In addition to arresting individuals for minor offenses, the officers are 
encouraged to make traffic stops in order to find weapons and other contra-
band.34 African Americans account for 40 percent of traffic stops in Minne-
apolis, even though they make up only 20 percent of the city's population.35 
One example of the effect of this policing model is seen in Hennepin 
County, Minnesota. At one point in 1995, after Minnesota adopted a "zero-
tolerance,,36 policing model, roughly 4,500 defendants were arrested in 
Hennepin County.37 Of that number, only 1,600 of them were presented to 
the Hennepin County Attorney's Office. Out of the 1,600, roughly 1,200 
were charged. Three hundred of the 1,200 received diversion (a program 
which allows first-time offenders the ability to avoid jail time on the condi-
tion that the criminal charges against the offender will be dismissed after a 
specified period of time if the offender successfully completes the pro-
gram).38 One hundred of them went to prison. Over 90 percent of the de-
fendants were released without convictions. Many of these were released 
because of a lack of probable cause.39 
"In 2004 in Hennepin County, there were 46,806 misdemeanor cases 
filed in the Fourth Judicial District Court. 28,818 did not result in a convic-
tion."4o In the same year in Ramsey County, there were 38,245 misde-
meanor cases filed in court; 16,838 did not result in conviction.41 According 
32. COUNCIL ON CRIME & JUSTICE, RACIAL DISPARITY, supra note 20, at 5. 
33. Human Rights Watch, Incarceration and Race, in UNITED STATES PUNISHMENT AND 
PREJUDICE: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE WAR ON DRUGS § III (May 2000), http://www.hrw.org/ 
reports/2000/usa! (follow "INCARCERATION AND RACE" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 17, 
2008) (Minnesota has "the greatest racial disparity in incarceration" of any state in the nation. 
"[B]lacks are incarcerated at 23 times the rate of whites .... [In Minnesota] a black man is 26.8 
times more likely to be in prison than a white man."); COUNCIL ON CRIME & JUSTICE, AFRICAN 
AMERICAN MALES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 1, http://www.racialdisparity.org/re-
ports_defining.php (follow "African American Males in the Criminal Justice System" hyperlink) 
(last visited Feb. 17, 2008) [hereinafter COUNSEL ON CRIME & JUSTICE, AFRICAN AMERICAN 
MALES] ("Compared to other states, Minnesota has the greatest black-to-white disparity in impris-
onment rates."). 
34. See COUNCIL ON CRIME & JUSTICE, RACIAL DISPARITY, supra note 20, at 6. 
35. Johnson & Heilman, supra note 14, What Do We Know?: Police Stops. 
36. See generally COUNCIL ON CRIME & JUSTICE, RACIAL DISPARITY, supra note 20, at 7. 
37. Kevin Burke, Dist. Court Judge, Defendants Contact with Criminal Justice System After 
Arrest, Lecture at the University of St. Thomas School of Law (Feb. 6, 2007). 
38. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 401.065 (West 2007). 
39. Burke, supra note 37 (A "probable cause determination" is a determination, based on the 
full record, of whether sufficient probable cause exists to proceed to trial.); State v. Bragg, 577 
N.W.2d 516, 520 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998). 
40. COUNCIL ON CRIME & JUSTICE, A BALANCED ApPROACH TOWARD PUBLIC ACCESSIBILITY 
TO ARREST RECORDS NOT LEADING TO CONVICTION 2 (unpublished legislation, Mar. 2007), avail-
able at http://www.pepp.org/new/tanibrief.pdf [hereinafter COUNCIL ON CRIME & JUSTICE, NON-
CONVICTION LEGISLATION]. 
41. Id. 
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to a Hennepin County District Court Judge, in certain situations, police 
have been known to arrest individuals in circumstances where the officers 
knew probable cause was lacking or non-existent only to release the indi-
viduals a few hours later with the goal of dissuading them from participat-
ing in criminal activity.42 
Evidence of the judge's declaration may be reflected by a report on 
low-level offenses conducted by the Council on Crime and Justice. African 
Americans are 15 times more likely than Caucasians to be arrested for low-
level offenses, but African American arrests were only 7 times more likely 
to result in conviction.43 "African Americans accounted for 72.3% of low 
level offense arrests" in Minneapolis; conviction rates for crimes such as 
lurking and loitering, however, were less than 10 percent.44 Out of 800 ar-
rests for the Minneapolis "lurking ordinance" in three and one-half years, 
almost 90 percent were dismissed.45 
A study of search warrants by the St. Paul Chapter of the NAACP and 
law students from three Minnesota law schools46 showed that search war-
rants were being executed by police officers in Ramsey County, Minnesota 
and the resulting arrests were frequently either dismissed or not charged as 
a result of a lack of probable cause.47 The arrest information for these indi-
viduals is not automatically sealed. Arrest records are publicly available 
until individuals take the proper steps to seal their records. Few individuals 
are able to take the proper steps to seal their records, however, because 
these options are not well known and may be cost-prohibitive. 
III. WHAT HAPPENS TO ARREST INFORMATION? 
After one is arrested in Minnesota, law enforcement agents must report 
a record of this arrest along with any other identifying information to the 
arresting agency, Minnesota's central court system and Minnesota's central 
repository.48 Minnesota's "central repository is the Bureau of Criminal Ap-
42. Burke, supra note 37. 
43. COUNCIL ON CRIME & JUSTICE, Low LEVEL OFFENSES IN MINNEAPOLIS - AN ANALYSIS 
OF ARRESTS AND THEIR OUTCOMES 3 (Nov. 2004), http://www.racialdisparity.org!reports_defin-
ing.php (follow "Low Level Offenses in Minneapolis - An Analysis of Arrests and their Out-
comes" hyperlink). 
44. COUNCIL ON CRIME & JUSTICE, KEy FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, http:// 
www.racialdisparity.org/reports_main.php (follow "READ THE BRIEFING SHEET" hyperlink 
under the heading "Key Findings") (last visited Feb. 17,2008). 
45. Gambill (Apr. 13, 2007, 03:58 CST), supra note 23. 
46. University of St. Thomas School of Law, Harn1ine School of Law, and William Mitchell 
School of Law. 
47. MINN. NAACP LEGAL CMTY. JUSTICE INITIATIVE, FINAL REpORT OF THE NAACP LEGAL 
COMMUNITY JUSTICE INITIATIVE: SEARCH WARRANT PRomCT 2 (2007) (unpublished final report, 
copy on file with author 'and St. Paul NAACP). 
48. See Stuckey, supra note 6, (manuscript at 6); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 299C.ll(I); MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 299C.lO(I)(b) (West 2007). 
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prehension (BCA),"49 which maintains a comprehensive criminal record for 
each person. 50 
Any member of the community may go online, go to the BCA or any 
authorized dissemination terminal and receive conviction data on an indi-
vidual.51 Public accessibility of conviction information is arguably justifia-
ble considering criminal and civil liability associated with due diligence 
requirements. Nevertheless, the public may still access the highly prejudi-
cial, and arguably irrelevant, non-conviction arrest data. 52 
"Currently, 15 states make their an'est data available to the public 
through their central repositories."53 "Another 17 states make exceptions 
which allow the data to be obtained almost as freely through their central 
repositories."54 The exception allows access to the arrest information by 
any individual with a notarized Informed Consent Form signed by the adult 
subject of the record.55 This exception allows employers or landlords to 
circumvent any restrictive arrest record laws. 
Arrest records in Minnesota are even easier to access at the local level. 
Any member of the public may contact an arresting agency and receive any 
arrest information on an arrested individual. The arrest information includes 
one's name, age, sex, address, charge, time and place of arrest and place of 
incarceration-but no information on the case's final disposition.56 
Additionally, information gatherers better known as "data harvesters," 
"data verifiers," "stringers" or "runners" have complete access to a person's 
49. Stuckey, Collateral Effects and Accessibility to Criminal Records, supra note 6, (manu-
script at 6); Minn. Dep't of Pub. Safety, Bureau of Criminal Apprehension Criminal Justice Infor-
mation Systems, ClIS-Criminal Record Checks, http://www.bca.state.mn.us/CJIS/Documents/ 
Page-l5-01.htrnl (follow "What is the Computerized Criminal History (CCH) system?" hyperlink: 
http://www.dps.state.mn.us/bca/CJIS/Documents/CCHInformation.html#What%20is%20the%20 
Computerized%20Criminal %20History%20(CCH)%20system) (last visited Feb. 17, 200S). 
50. Stuckey, supra note 6, (manuscript at 6); see MINN. STAT. ANN. § 13.S7(l)(b) (West 
2007) (information "public data for 15 years"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 299C.11(1). 
51. Minn. Dep't of Pub. Safety, supra note 49, at "Who can access public records?"; see 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 13.S7(1) ("Conviction will be publicly disseminated for 15 years after dis-
charge of sentence."). 
52. Stuckey, supra note 6, (manuscript at 6); see Minn. Dep't of Pub. Safety, supra note 49, 
at "How can I obtain a copy of another person's criminal history record?" and "What is the 
Informed Consent procedure that needs to be followed when requesting another individual's pri-
vate criminal history?" (authorized agencies receive an'est data; however, arrest data may be ob-
tained with the arrestee's authorized signature). 
53. Stuckey, supra note 6, (manuscript at 6); SHAWN D. STUCKEY & HEATHER E. CHAUSSEE, 
CRIMINAL RECORD ACCESSIBILITY SURVEY: A SUMMARY OF ARREST AND CONVICTION INFORMA-
TION AMONG THE 50 STATES MAINTAINED BY THE STATE'S CENTRAL REpOSITORY, http:// 
www.crimeandjustice.org (forthcoming 200S) (copy on file with author and Council on Crime & 
Justice) (15 states make arrest data public; however, 17 states have exceptions which make arrest 
data accessible). 
54. ld. 
55. Minn. Dep't of Pub. Safety, supra note 49, at "What is the Informed Consent procedure 
that needs to be followed when requesting another individual's private criminal history?" 
56. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 13.S2(2)(a)-(m). 
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arrest information.57 Data harvesters are people who go to dissemination 
terminals in courthouses, law enforcement centers, or the BCA, and gather 
information on any individual who has been arrested in that particular juris-
diction. The data harvesters attend the dissemination terminals daily; the 
information on someone arrested the night before has the potential to be 
accessed by the data harvester. Those individuals then sell that bulk infor-
mation to anyone who is willing to buy (e.g., data verification agencies, 
credit agencies and attorneys). The Minnesota legislature has gone to con-
siderable means to make arrest information electronically inaccessible to 
the public. 58 This, in turn, astronomically increases the value of information 
possessed by data harvesters. 
Furthermore, the media has access to the arrested individual's informa-
tion regardless of the outcome of the charge.59 In other words, someone 
whose arrest was dismissed many years ago may still have his arrest infor-
mation reported by the media. Since the disposition of that charge is often 
unknown, the media will often neglect to report that the charge was ulti-
mately thrown out. 
IV. WHAT ARE THE COLLATERAL EFFECTS OF AN ARREST? 
An arrest results in two types of consequences: direct and collateral. 
Direct consequences flow directly from a conviction (e.g., the sentence or 
fine).60 In contrast, collateral consequences, better known as collateral ef-
fects,61 are "civil and regulatory in nature and are imposed in the interest of 
57. See MINN. R. OF PUB. ACCESS TO REC. OF THE JUD. BRANCH § 8(2)(a) (2005), available 
at http://www.mncourts.gov/rules/publicaccess/accessrules.pdf (describing how a person shall be 
allowed to obtain copies of original versions of records that are accessible to the public. "[A] 
custodian ... must provide remote electronic access to ... records."). 
58. See id. at § 8(2)(c): 
Preconviction Criminal Records. The Information Technology Division of the Supreme 
Court shall make reasonable efforts and expend reasonable and proportionate resources 
to prevent preconviction criminal records from being electronically searched by defen-
dant name by the majority of known, mainstream automated tools .... A 'preconviction 
criminal record' is a record for which there is no conviction as defined in MINN. STAT. 
§ 609.02, subd. 5 (2004) .... 
59. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 13.82(2) ("[Arrest data] shall be public at all times in the 
originating agency."); see generally Quinn, 517 N.W.2d at 895. 
60. Stuckey, supra note 6, (manuscript at 16) (citing Alanis V. State, 583 N.W.2d 573, 578 
(Minn. 1998) ("those which flow definitely, immediately, and automatically from the guilty plea, 
namely, the maximum sentence to be imposed and the amount of any fine"». 
61. Stuckey, supra note 6, (manuscript at 16) (citing A.B.A., supra note 6, at Standard 19-
l.1(a». This Comment uses the terms collateral effects, collateral consequences, and collateral 
sanctions synonymously. 
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public safety."62 Collateral effects have a stigmatizing effect on 
individuals. 63 
With [collateral effects], people are separated into groups of ac-
ceptables and unacceptables or ... classifications of insiders and 
outsiders . . . . The label therefore infers that the person did not 
just do something wrong, but that there is something wrong with 
the person.64 
Collateral effects have a legally binding impact on arrested individuals 
in Minnesota. Although explicitly pertaining to convictions, the Minnesota 
revisor of statutes identified approximately 150 statutory collateral effects 
in Minnesota.65 
Collateral effects of arrests hinder the progress of Minnesotans in 
many ways, but most importantly through the denial of jobs and housing.66 
Over 80 percent of large employers use criminal history checks in the hiring 
process.67 Over 60 percent of employers indicate that they probably would 
not or definitely would not hire someone with a criminal record, including 
those with only an arrest record containing no conviction.68 Additionally, 
private screening companies have made it very easy and inexpensive to 
locate an individual's complete criminal record, further encouraging em-
ployers to access non-conviction arrest information in Minnesota.69 
Competing interests justify making conviction records easily accessi-
ble to employers.7o Nevertheless, the public availability of arrest informa-
62. Stuckey, supra note 6, (manuscript at 16) (citing Kaiser v. State, 641 N.W.2d 900, 905 
(Minn. 2002». 
63. See Megan C. Kurlychek, Robert Brame, & Shawn Bushway, Enduring Risk? Old Crimi-
nal Records and Predictions of Future Criminal Involvement, 53 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 64 
(2007). 
64. COUNCIL ON CRIME & JUSTICE, NON-CONVICTION LEGISLATION, supra note 40, at 2 (quot-
ing id.). 
65. Id.; see generally MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609B (West 2007). 
66. Stuckey, supra note 6, (manuscript at 20). 
67. Id.; Jon Bonne, supra note 9: 
A report from the Society for Human Resource Management shows that 80 percent of 
companies said they run a criminal check on applicants before hiring, up nearly 30 
percent from 1996-making the practice as common as checking references or prior 
work histories .... Large firms were the most likely to run criminal checks, but nearly 
70 percent of small companies also said they checked on a potential hire's criminal 
history.; 
Megan C. Kurlychek, Robert Brame, & Shawn Bushway, Scarlet Letters and Recidivism: Does an 
Old Criminal Record Predict Future Offending?, 5 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'y 483, 483-504 
(2006). 
68. Stuckey, supra note 6, (manuscript at 21) (citing Steven Raphael, Should Criminal His-
tory Records Be Universally Available?, 5 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'y 515, 517 (2006». 
69. Cf, SEARCH, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TASK FORCE ON THE COMMERCIAL SALE OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE RECORD INFORMATION 32 (2005) (describing how after 9/11 ChoicePoint re-
ported a 30 percent increase and HireCheck reported a 25 percent increase in business). 
70. DEREK HINTON, CRIMINAL RECORDS BOOK: THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE LEGAL USE OF 
CRIMINAL RECORDS 79 (Michael L. Sankey & Peter J. Weber eds., 2002) (describing how negli-
gent hiring is a legal doctrine which imposes a duty upon employers who fail to perform a reason-
able background check); see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REpORT ON 
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tion which has not resulted in conviction is far too prejudicial and aids 
greatly in denying deserving individuals of beneficial job opportunities. The 
constitutional argument against employer accessibility of arrest records is 
that the individual was not or-in the case of a pending criminal proceed-
ing-has not been convicted of the crime and, therefore, should not be de-
nied a position based on the accusations detailed in the police report and 
court documents. Employers will sometimes use the information to categor-
ically deny employment to individuals who are accused but not proven 
guilty.71 
Sympathetic employers are hamstrung by legislative activity and the 
necessity of maximizing profit by limiting liability.72 Many employers are 
legally obligated-by either criminal or civil sanctions-to ask for criminal 
history information.73 Still others have a legitimate personal interest in as-
sessing the risks to their assets and reputations posed by placing persons 
with criminal histories in certain positions.74 
Most people think low-level jobs, which have lower educational re-
quirements, like fast-food employers or grocery and retail chains, are al-
ways an avenue to which persons with criminal histories may turn for 
employment.75 Unfortunately, employers whose workers interact directly 
with customers are the most adverse to hiring workers with criminal histo-
ries.76 This heavily impacts entry-level fast food employers like McDon-
ald's or department stores like Wal-Mart.77 Often an employer will make an 
offer, only to rescind it after completing a background check.78 If an indi-
vidual is arrested and has not taken efforts to expunge his or her arrest data, 
there is a significant chance that individual will be denied employment. 
CRIMINAL HISTORY BACKGROUND CHECKS 1 (June 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/ 
ag_bgchecks_report.pdf (describing how employers and organizations are subject to liability 
under negligent hiring doctrines if they fail to exercise due diligence in determining whether the 
individual would create an unreasonable risk to other employees or the public). 
71. See generally Partners in Justice, supra note 25, at 742 (describing how employers in 
most states can deny jobs to anyone with a criminal record). 
72. See HINTON, supra note 70, at 79. 
73. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 70, at 1 (describing how negligent hiring imposes a 
duty upon employers to perform a background check and subjects them to potential liability if 
they fail to exercise due diligence in determining whether the individual would create an unrea-
sonable risk to other employees or the public). 
74. Stuckey, supra note 6, (manuscript at 21) (citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 70, at 
1 (describing how employers want to assess the risks to their assets and reputations posed by 
placing persons with criminal histories in certain positions». 
75. See id. 
76. [d. (manuscript at 22) (citing Raphael, supra note 68, at 515). 
77. Stuckey, supra note 6, (manuscript at 22). 
78. [d. As one rehabilitated African American father stated, "You not asking for some spe-
cific discipline, I'm coming in here, this is a warehouse, you want someone to lower boxes and 
work on the dock, I think I can do that. And then we'll do the background check and comes back, 
'thanks for your interest' and all that. I got a whole folder for 'thanks for your interest'-But I 
don't got a job." COUNSEL ON CRIME & JUSTICE, RACIAL DISPARITY, supra note 20, at 7. 
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Although many believe an employer cannot make a decision based on 
an arrest record, it happens frequently. In the absence of a state law or 
regulation, employers in 37 states are permitted to use arrest information as 
well as conviction information when deciding whether or not to hire some-
one.19 But, even in states where the practice is illegal, an employer may still 
circumvent the law by using arrest information to judge an applicant's fit-
ness for ajob, the same way they would use one's answers or demeanor in 
an interview. Even the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) permits the use of arrest and misdemeanor information in the hir-
ing process. Nevertheless, the EEOC "states that employers should not ask 
applicants about arrests which have not lead [sic] to convictions, since such 
questions may have a 'chilling effect' upon minorities and discourage them 
from applying for ajob."80 Therefore, if employers may access one's infor-
mation, there is nothing to prevent the employer from using the non-convic-
tion data against applicants. 
Similarly, landlords perform background checks which many times un-
fairly disqualify applicants.81 Decent housing prevents crime because where 
one lives influences many aspects of one's life.82 Nevertheless, a landlord 
may access arrest information on an individual which mayor may not con-
tain the disposition of the charge. Therefore, to relieve themselves of civil 
or criminal liability, landlords may refuse to rent apartments or houses to 
individuals who were justifiably or unjustifiably arrested. 
As long as the arrest information is available, use of the information is 
arguably justified. Even if an arrestee asserts that his arrest was dismissed, 
since the disposition of a charge is often unreported, the employer or land-
lord may feel the applicant is simply denying the charge to obtain the em-
ployment or housing. Employers or landlords are in a precarious position 
79. Partners in Justice, supra note 25, at 743. Thirty-seven states have laws permitting all 
employers and occupational licensing agencies to ask about and consider arrests that never led to 
conviction in making employment decisions. Ten states prohibit all employers and occupational 
licensing agencies, and 3 states prohibit some. Employers in most states can deny jobs to-or 
fire-anyone with a criminal record, regardless of individual history, circumstance, or "business 
necessity." Id. 
80. GLOBAL INFORMATION NETWORK, USING ARREST, CONVICTION, AND MISDEMEANOR IN-
FORMATION IN THE HIRING PROCESS 1, http://www.searchinfo.com/resources/links.asp (follow 
"Using Arrest, Conviction, and Misdemeanor Information in the Hiring Process" hyperlink) (last 
visited Feb. 18, 2007). 
81. Heidi Lee Cain, Student Author, Housing Our Criminals: Finding Housing for the Ex-
offender in the Twenty-First Century, 33 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 131, 149-50 (2003). See 
generally 24 C.F.R. § 5.903 (2000) (permitting public housing agencies to access criminal 
records); 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(q) (2000) (explaining that criminal activity by any member of the 
tenant's household or guest results in eviction); Minneapolis Pub. Hous. Auth. v. Lor, 591 N.W.2d 
700, 702 (Minn. 1999) (holding criminal activity committed off premises grounds for eviction); 
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 5101, 102 Stat. 4181, 4300; 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1437d(I)(6) (2000). 
82. See Cain, supra note 81, at 137-38; Rene Bowser, Prof. of Law, Univ. of St. Thomas 
Sch. of Law, Segregation and Housing Discrimination in the African American Community, Lec-
ture (Nov. 13, 2006) ("Where one lives often influences one's health, education, and income."). 
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when they face hiring someone who may have been arrested for a violent 
crime or a property crime, and the employer or landlord does not know the 
disposition of the charge. If an employer or landlord refuses to hire or rent 
to the arrestee, they may be unjustifiably denying someone an opportunity. 
If they hire or rent to the arrestee and he commits a crime while on the 
premises, then the employer or landlord can be subject to civil liability 
(e.g., negligent hiring and supervision) or costly property loss and damage. 
Rather than face the latter, employers and landlords lean toward the most 
financially secure option-denial of employment or housing. 
Additionally, applications which ask if an individual has "ever been 
arrested" may be a hindrance to an individual with an arrest record-but for 
an unexpected reason.83 Employers and landlords actually disqualify more 
individuals for issues relating to truthfulness and "moral turpitude" when 
the applicants refuse to reveal the information when asked.84 Only if an 
applicant seals or removes his or her information will he or she lawfully be 
able to deny the arrest. 
Finally, the effects of a published arrest record can be devastating. 
Many times people assign guilt with accusation, especially if an arrest is 
published in a newspaper or any other bona fide media outlet. All media 
outlets have access to arrest information by virtue of the information's pub-
lic classification, or the ability of the media to be classified as an "ag-
grieved person."85 Since most media outlets do not publish the disposition 
of the crimes, one is usually presumed guilty until they prove themselves 
innocent-this can hinder one's public or social reception severely and sig-
nificantly hinder the chances of a public career. 
V. LEGISLATION 
In the 2007 spring legislative session, there were four states-Minne-
sota, Maryland, New Jersey and Massachusetts-that introduced proposals 
to automatically seal arrest data not resulting in convictions (non-conviction 
data).86 Of particular interest was the impetus for the proposed bill in Mary-
land. The proposal derived from a class-action suit filed jointly by the 
NAACP and ACLU. The lawsuit highlighted arrest and dismissal rates in 
Maryland-with special interest on the effect on the African American and 
83. See Telephone Interview with Kevin Spang, President, Verified Credentials, Inc., in 
Lakeville, Minn. (Feb. 21, 2007) (copy on file with author). 
84. Id. 
85. Quinn, 517 N.W.2d at 898 (explaining the media was entitled under Government Data 
Practices Act to access to law enforcement records; an aggrieved person may claim a protectable 
interest in the information of an arrested individual). 
86. See Minn. S.P. No. 279, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mar. 12, 2007), available at http://www. 
revisor.leg.state.mn.us/bin/bldbill.php?bill=S0279.2.html&session=ls85; E-mail from Guy 
Gambill, Advocacy Coordinator, Council on Crime & Justice, to author (Aug. 12, 2007, 12:45 
CST) (on file with author). 
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minority communities.87 Maryland enforcement agencies were asked to re-
spond to the revelation that a large number of arrests for misdemeanors 
were ultimately dismissed, leaving thousands of individuals-many of them 
minorities-subject to the collateral effects of arrests.88 Mary land officials 
did not respond adequately and the result was a favorable settlement to the 
NAACP and ACLU.89 
In Minnesota, the Council on Crime and Justice (CCJ) introduced leg-
islation similar to that introduced in Maryland for similar reasons. Senator 
Moua, CCJ's chief author, and her colleagues Senators Neuville, Higgins, 
Betzold and Ortman all signed on as bipartisan co-authors. CCJ proposed 
the automatic sealing of arrest data so that only criminal justice agencies 
could access arrest data and use it against an individual before a determina-
tion of guilt. 90 This automatic sealing would occur for all arrests that did 
not result in prosecution within 180 days after the arrest.91 
Additionally, many agencies have proposed expungement legislation 
with the goal of overruling the holding in State of Minnesota v. Schultz,92 
which eliminated the inherent authority of the courts to expunge records 
held at the BCA. Various pieces of legislation seek to present an alternative 
to inherent power expungement, but will, in effect, constrain the available 
remedies to the extent that help for petitioners will be very limited. The best 
outcome would be to overturn Schultz93 so that courts have their inherent 
authority restored. 
VI. WHAT CAN ONE Do TO PROTECT PERSONAL ARREST INFORMATION? 
One who would like to seal and, in many cases, completely remove 
arrest information from the public may do so in one of several ways: by 
requesting the return of one's original arrest information from the arresting 
agency (where law requires the material must be held), by obtaining an 
expungement through the inherent powers of the court, by obtaining an ex-
87. See Md. State Conference of the NAACP Branches v. BaIt. City Police Dep't, Complaint 
(Civil Case No. 24-C-06-005088) (June 14, 2006), available at http://www.ac1u-md.org/aPress/ 
BCPD%20Complaint.pdf [hereinafter NAACP v. BaIt. City Police Dep't]; Gambill, (Aug. 12, 
2007, 12:45 CST), supra note 87. 
88. See NAACP v. BaIt. City Police Dep't, supra note 87; Gambill (Apr. 13, 2007, 3:58 
CST), supra note 23. 
89. Racial Profiling Data Collection Resource Center, Federal and State Litigation, http:// 
www.racialprofilinganalysis.neu.edu/legislation/litigation.php?state=4 (last visited Feb. 18, 2008). 
90. COUNCIL ON CRIME & JUSTICE, COMPARISON OF RECOMMENDATIONS BY EXPUNGEMENT 
DELIVERY TEAM AND THE 2007 PROPOSED 609B LEGISLATION (Feb. 2006) (on file with author and 
the Council on Crime & Justice) [hereinafter COUNCIL ON CRIME & JUSTICE, COMPARISON OF 
RECOMMENDATIONS ]. 
91. [d. ("Arrests that do not result in prosecution: automatic sealing of record of arrest 180 
days after arrest."). 
92. See State v. Schultz, 676 N.W.2d 337, 342 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004). 
93. Id. 
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pungement according to the provisions enumerated in the Minnesota stat-
utes or by receiving a judicial pardon. 
A minority of states-including Minnesota-offer procedures 
whereby individuals may contact an arresting agency and request that the 
original documents and any copies be surrendered so that the public may 
never again access the arrest and identification information.94 However, 
even in the states offering this procedure, most citizens and many, if not 
most, practitioners are unaware of its existence.95 Moreover, when the au-
thor called several police and government offices responsible for returning 
the information, they were not aware that such an option is available.96 The 
author phoned to request the return of an individual's arrest information 
after the individual's charges were dropped absent a finding of probable 
cause.97 The author was told by these sources that no such option existed 
until the author spoke with a city attorney and quoted a copy of the stat-
ute.98 The city attorney eventually agreed to return the original arrest 
information. 
There is a compelling argument to be made that one should almost 
always attempt to receive a combination of these options. Arrest informa-
tion is held at the arresting agency, at the BCA, and in the statewide court 
system. A statutory expungement and a request for the return of arrest infor-
mation sometimes encompass similar circumstances; in this situation an in-
dividual may apply for both in the same proceeding.99 A request for the 
return of arrest information does not require a fee; however, some arrest 
agencies will charge a fee of five dollars.lOo If that happens, the arrest 
agency is referring to a copying fee and is not operating under the under-
standing that the requestor is asking for the original arrest records so that 
they are no longer available for copying.lOl Both expungement forms re-
quire a $250.00 filing fee, which may be waived in cases of demonstrated 
94. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 299C.11(1)(b) (requiring the return of law enforcement identifi-
cation data where a person is arrested but not charged). She may have her identification data 
returned upon request as long as she has not been convicted of a felony or gross misdemeanor in 
the 10 years preceding the resolution of the criminal proceeding. Id. 
95. See, e.g., Interview with Terry Duggins, criminal defense attorney, in St. Paul, Minn., 
(June 21, 2007) (copy on file with author). 
96. The author contacted a Minneapolis suburban police department on Dec. 29, 2006, and 
spoke to its clerk of records, who had not heard of the procedure (copy of conversation on file 
with author). 
97. Id. 
98. Telephone Interview with the Minnetonka City Attorney, Minnetonka, Minn., (Dec. 29, 
2006) (on file with author). 
99. State v. Bragg, 577 N.W.2d 516,521 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that defendant may 
seek an order for recovery of identification evidence in the same proceedings as a petition for 
expungement). 
100. See generally MINN. STAT. ANN. § 13.87. 
101. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
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poverty.102 Additionally, proceedings that have ended in favor of a peti-
tioner will not require a filing fee.103 Nevertheless, a requestor must inform 
the clerk and, in many cases, send a copy of the authorizing statute before 
the clerk will waive the filing fee. A pardon does not require a filing fee, 
but requires a call to the secretary of the Minnesota Board of Pardons, at 
which time the secretary will screen the caller to determine initial pardon 
eligibility.104 None of the options require a requestor to have an attorney, 
and there are clinics and attorneys who are willing to help, in some cases 
for free. 
A. Retrieving Records from Arresting Agency 
Before contacting the arresting agency, interested persons should make 
sure they satisfy the preconditions. First, the charges that flow from the 
arrest must be dismissed before an official determination of probable cause 
is made. Second, an individual must verify that the he or she had not been 
convicted of a felony or gross misdemeanor within a ten-year period imme-
diately before the arrest and ensure that one of the following is also true: all 
charges were (1) dismissed prior to a determination of probable cause; 105 or 
(2) the prosecuting authority declined to file any charges and a grand jury 
did not return an indictment. If these conditions are met, then one need only 
submit a request to the arresting agency for the return of the arrest and 
identification records.106 
For example, if one is arrested for a crime (e.g., lurking, loitering, or 
assault) and, after release, the prosecutor dismissed the charges or declined 
to file charges because of a conclusion that there was not probable cause to 
arrest, and the individual has not been convicted of a felony or gross misde-
meanor within ten years prior to arrest, then an arrestee need only mail in 
the "Return of Arrest Records Request" form in Appendix II. If an arrestee 
does not receive a notification of the dismissal of the charges, or notifica-
tion from the prosecutor or court of refusal to file charges, that person must 
contact the court or prosecutor to ensure that charges are not being pursued. 
No matter what happens an individual must still request the return of the 
identifying information. 
102. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609A.03(1) (West 2007) ("An individual ... shall file a petition ... 
and pay a filing fee .... The filing fee may be waived in [some] cases .... "). 
103. Id. 
104. See Telephone Interview with Randolph J. Hartnett, Sec. Minn. Bd. of Pardons, Minn. 
Dep't of Corrections, Pol'y and Legal Services, Admin. Interstate Agreement on Detainers, in St. 
Paul, Minn. (Apr. 16, 2007) (on file with author). 
105. Bragg, 577 N.W.2d at 520 (interpreting "probable cause determination" to mean a deter-
mination, based on the full record, of whether sufficient probable cause exists to proceed to trial, 
essentially referring to an omnibus hearing). 
106. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 299C.ll(b). 
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B. Expungement 
If charges were not dismissed until after a determination that probable 
cause was lacking, then one must request an expungement.107 Expungement 
is the removal of a conviction from a person's criminal record. lOB However, 
an expungement only seals a person's criminal record; it does not destroy 
it. 109 In Minnesota, expungements are available by statute or through the 
inherent power of the court. 110 The main difference is that statutory ex-
pungement allows all records to be expunged from the public record 
whereas inherent power expungement is limited to only the courts and not 
to executive agencies like the BCA. III 
Statutory expungement may only be obtained if an individual qualifies 
according to very strict standards set forth by the Minnesota legislature, 
which makes this outcome very hard to obtain. 112 Minnesota Statute Sec-
tion 609A calls for the "sealing" of records for all proceedings that have 
ended "in favor of' the defendant, as well as juvenile adjudications, and 
certain drug convictions.113 Proceedings ending "in favor of' the defendant 
would include a decision by the prosecutor not to charge the case, a not 
guilty verdict or dismissal from appeal. 114 An order for statutory expunge-
ment extends to all agencies that have a record of the incident, including the 
BCA, where the vast majority of the requests for criminal history informa-
tion are made. 115 
Inherent power expungement gives the court the discretion to consider, 
on a case-by-case basis, an individual's request to have his or her record 
107. Jon Geffen & Stefanie Letze, Chained to the Past: An Overview of Criminal Expunge-
ment Law in Minnesota-State v. Schultz, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1331, 1333 (2005); see 
MINN. R. OF PUB. ACCESS TO REC. OF THE JUD. BRANCH § 8(4) (defining the contents of police 
department investigative file as public data within meaning of Government Data Practices Act, but 
classification of information as public does not prevent its expungement). A trial court can, in its 
discretion, order expungement of all publicly classified information pertaining to arrest and prose-
cution. [d. For information about expungement of a criminal record, contact the Minnesota Judi-
cial Center at 651-297-7650 or the Self-Help Center on the Minnesota Judicial Center's web site: 
www.mncoul'ts.gov/selfuelp. Or contact a private attorney or visit www.MinnesotaExpungement. 
com. 
108. State v. C.P.H., 707 N.W.2d 699,705 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) ("Expungement means to 
erase all evidence of the event as if it never occurred."); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, at 
"expungment of record" (8th ed. 2004) (defining expungement of record). 
109. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609A.01 (West 2007). 
110. State v. Ambaye, 616 N.W.2d 256, 257 (Minn. 2000) (explaining that a court order or 
statutory language may provide the authority for expungement); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609A.01. 
111. See Geffen & Letze, supra note 107, at 1360 (discussing the use of the BCA to respond 
to requests about criminal history information); State v. P.A.D., 436 N.W.2d 808, 810 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1989). 
112. See generally MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609A.OI-02 (West 2007). 
113. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609A.02(2) (offering expungement where petitioner was ajuvenile). 
114. See State v. M.C., 304 N.W.2d 362, 363 (Minn. 1981); Schultz, 676 N.W.2d at 340. 
115. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609A.01 ("The remedy ... prohibit[s] the disclosure of their 
existence or their opening except under court order or statutory authority."); Geffen & Letze, 
supra note 107, at 1360. 
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expunged. The courts examine whether the petitioner's constitutional rights 
have been infringed upon by the publication of the information.116 If there 
is no constitutional infringement, the courts determine whether society's 
interest in information about the person's criminal history is outweighed by 
the detriment to the rehabilitation efforts of the individual.117 However, 
State v. Schultz 11 8 eliminated the inherent authority of the courts to expunge 
records held at the BCA,119 restricting the power of the courts to only the 
records held by the court system. Thus, these expungements lack effective-
ness because almost all employment agencies and landlords go through the 
BCA to obtain criminal history information. 120 
C. Pardon 
Another mechanism available to protect arrest information is a judicial 
pardon.121 Although the constitutional and statutory authority for pardons in 
Minnesota is limited to granting clemency for "convictions," they can, in 
rare cases, address arrest information.122 Opponents of expanding the ex-
pungement statute suggest pardons as a sufficient alternative because the 
Minnesota State Board of Pardons123 has the power to allow the recipient 
116. Schultz, 676 N.W.2d at 340, 343 (pointing out that the requirement is that petitioner's 
"constitutional rights may be seriously infringed" by keeping the record, which is rarely met 
because of the state's interest in separation of powers). 
117. [d. at 340-41 ("[E]xpungement will yield a benefit to the petitioner commensurate with 
the disadvantages to the public."). 
118. [d. at 342-44 (explaining that the separation of powers doctrine limits inherent power of 
court to records held by judiciary); see generally CriMNet, BACKGROUND CHECKS, supra note 1, 
at 75 ("The Schultz case has become a focal point and center of controversy for the discussion 
about courts' lack of authority to order executive branch agencies, notably the BCA and other law 
enforcement agencies, to expunge their records under inherent authority expungement orders of 
the courts."). 
119. Schultz, 676 N.W.2d at 339, 343 (upholding State v. T.M.B., 590 N.W.2d 809, 811 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1999)) (limiting inherent power expungements, where the records are held by 
agencies of another branch, absent evidence of "an injustice resulting from an abuse of discretion 
in the performance of a governmental function"); see also State v. H.A., 716 N.W.2d 360, 364 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (upholding Schultz, 676 N.W.2d at 341); State v. A.C.H., 710 N.W.2d 587, 
591 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (upholding Schultz, 676 N.W.2d at 343). 
120. Geffen & Letze, supra note 107, at 1360-61; Johnson, supra note 2 ("[The] [r]eality is, 
[an inherent power of court expungement] doesn't make much of a difference because employers 
and landowners go to the BCA. This is a decision the Supreme Court should look into."). 
121. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 638.02(1) (West 2007) ("The board of pardons may grant an abso-
lute or a conditional pardon .... "); see CriMNet, BACKGROUND CHECKS, supra note 1, at 66 
("Every state constitution provides for an executive pardon authority. In 42 states and for federal 
offenders, pardon is the only system-wide mechanism for relief by which adult felony offenders 
can mitigate collateral effects .... "). 
122. See MINN. BD. OF PARDONS, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE: 2005 ACTIVITY 3 
(2006), available at http://www.corr.state.mn.us/publications/legislativereports/documentsl 
BOP2005report.pdf ("[T]he Office of the Attorney General issued an opinion that the Board did 
have authority under these unique circumstances and the applicant was granted a pardon 
extraordinary ."). 
123. CriMNet, BACKGROUND CHECKS, supra note 1, at 66 ("The Governor, Attorney General, 
and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court constitute the Board of Pardons."). 
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the benefit of never again having to reveal the conviction, with a few excep-
tions.124 But, this argument is very misleading because pardons are rarely 
given. 125 In the last twenty-two years, the Board of Pardons has not granted 
any pardons and few "pardon extraordinary" grants.126 Also, when a pardon 
or pardon extraordinary is given, the records are never sealed. 127 Therefore, 
agencies, landlords, and employers performing background checks may still 
access the record. 128 Since a person may legally deny a conviction,129 a 
landlord or employet' may think:. that person is dishonest and deny him or 
her an opportunity for housing or employment. 13o Additionally, in many 
states, unless an individual receives a pardon extraordinary, a party in court 
may use an individual's criminal record to impeach his or her testimony. 131 
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This Comment serves as a call to the Minnesota legislature, the Minne-
sota Supreme Court and all Minnesota stakeholders, including those who 
view accessibility to criminal history records as an unequivocal right, and 
those who fight vehemently to protect the rights of the accused, to work 
together to acknowledge and understand the impact of collateral effects.132 
The recommendations below serve as a roadmap to facilitate this discussion 
and provide adequate tools to consequently alter the backlash of collateral 
effects to be more consistent with the original purpose and intent of the 
laws.133 
A. Protect Information Now! 
I recommend anyone with an arrest record follow the procedures out-
lined in Section VI. 
124. See Stuckey, supra note 6, (manuscript at 11). See generally Geffen & Letze, supra note 
107, at 1346; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 638.02(1). 
125. Stuckey, supra note 6, (manuscript at 11); see also CriMNet, BACKGROUND CHECKS, 
supra note. 1, at 60, 68 ("In Minnesota, pardons are very rare. . .. [and] used sparingly in all but a 
very few U.S. jurisdictions."); MARGARET COLGATE LoVE, RELIEF FROM THE COLLATERAL CONSE-
QUENCES OF A CRIMINAL CONVICTION: A STATE-By-STATE RESOURCE GUIDE, at Minnesota-4 
(2006) ("In 2003 10 pardons [were] granted out of a total of 17 applicants-six [were] denied, one 
did not appear for hearing. Three [were] found ineligible.") (citing BOARD OF PARDONS, ANNUAL 
REpORT TO THE LEGISLATURE: 2003 ACTNITY (2004». 
126. Hartnett, supra note 104. 
127. State v. Haugen, No. K8450, 1999 WL 138730, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (statute calls 
for a copy of the pardon to be sent to the executive agencies but does not call for them to seal the 
record). 
128. Geffen & Letze, supra note 107, at 1360-61. 
129. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 638.02(2) (West 2007). 
130. Stuckey, supra note 6, (manuscript at 12); Geffen & Letze, supra note 107, at 1346-47. 
131. See Stuckey, supra note 6, (manusaript at 12); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 638.02(2). 
132. Stuckey, supra note 6, (manuscript at 29-30). 
133. [d. 
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B. Consider the CCl's Arrest Expungement Legislation134 
I recommend that the Minnesota legislature pass the arrest records ac-
cessibility legislation produced by the CCJ. 135 CCJ proposes placing an au-
tomatic seal on arrest data, so that non-criminal justice agencies cannot 
access a person's data and use it against him or her before a determination 
of guilt. 136 The arrest legislation also requests that all arrests that do not 
result in prosecution be automatically sealed within 180 days after the ar-
rest. 137 This will preclude the public from "publicly convicting" a person 
and making unfair determinations before the individual's case has been ad-
judicated. Additionally, CCJ's legislation asks that arrest records in cases 
with dispositions in favor of the defendant be automatically sealed and the 
records strictly controlled and kept only within the criminal justice 
agencies. 138 
Alternative legislation is being proposed by a Minnesota task force, 
CriMNet Expungement Delivery Teams. 139 For non-person crimes, the task 
force is proposing an automatic seal of arrest information one year after 
arrest. 140 If accepted, the legislation will achieve the overarching goal of 
decreasing the availability of long-term prejudicial arrest information. Nev-
ertheless, the task force's recommendation ignores the short-term prejudi-
cial effect of arrest information. Minorities are arrested exceedingly more 
often in Minnesota and are, therefore, left vulnerable to the weaknesses of 
the task force's recommendation. CCJ's legislation would ensure that 
proper criminal justice agencies have the necessary and relevant informa-
tion while providing a justifiable protection to arrested individuals. 
134. Stuckey, supra note 6, (manuscript at 29). 
135. See COUNCIL ON CRIME & JUSTICE, COMPARISON OF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 90, 
at 1-2. 
136. Id. 
137. Id at 1 (discussing "[l]egislation (Section 2, Subd.1) [for] automatic sealing of record of 
arrest ISO days after arrest"). 
13S. COUNCIL ON CRIME & JUSTICE, COMPARISON OF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 90, at 1 
("Legislation (Section 3, Subd.l & 3): automatic sealing of records of 1) charges that were dis-
missed; 2) acquittals; 3) continuance for dismissal; 4) diversion; 5) dismiss and discharge under 
§ 152.1S."); see also id. ("Legislation (Section 3): 1) Sealed data may still be transmitted between 
criminal justice agencies."). 
139. See generally CriMNet, Criminal and Juvenile Justice Information Policy Group: Report 
to the Legislature on Background Checks and Sealing of Criminal Records, http:// 
www.crimnet.state.mn.us/docsIBGCheckSealingReportFinaI200S.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 200S) 
(comprised of Criminal and Juvenile Justice Information Task Force and Background Checks and 
Expungements Delivery Team with the purpose of making a proposal to the Minnesota legislature 
regarding criminal history accessibility legislation). 
140. COUNCIL ON CRIME & JUSTICE, COMPARISON OF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 90, at 1. 
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C. Implement Mandated Informed Consent of Collateral Effects When a 
Person Is Released After Arrest 
Every arrested individual should be advised of his or her rights to re-
ceive the return of arrest information if the arrest does not end in a convic-
tion. I recommend the "Collateral Consequences Committee," which was 
created by the Minnesota legislature per the American Bar Association's 
recommendations, take the research compiled by the Minnesota revisor in 
Section 609B.050 of the Minnesota statutes regarding statutory codification 
of criminal convictions in Minnesota, and apply that information to facili-
tate an exploration of every collateral effect applicable to arrests. 141 The 
results of the study commissioned by the Collateral Consequences Commit-
tee should then mandate that the applicable collateral effects be delineated 
at each arrest and displayed in a simplified, understandable format for the 
defendant. Each collateral effect should be placed on the charging form or 
on a separate form. A brief explanation should be required, which need not 
be long and cumbersome. An explanation would take no longer than the 
time it currently takes to release a defendant. 
All police agencies should be required to advise arrestees of the collat-
eral effects they may face if their arrests do not result in a conviction. Addi-
tionally, all police agencies should be required to advise an arrestee of the 
options available if his or her arrest does not result in a conviction. This is a 
feasible solution because this information may simply be attached to the 
defendant's charging form or given to him or her separately in a pamphlet 
as they are released. 
Following these recommendations will foster awareness among de-
fendants and police agencies about the total consequences of an arrest. The 
police agencies will have to see firsthand the effects of any abuse of discre-
tion in which they engage when they arrest an individual without probable 
cause. The arrestee will become more aware of options available. Finally, 
motivation and deterrence are achieved. Full knowledge of the collateral 
effects associated with each arrest will cause one to more thoroughly con-
sider all of the ramifications of one's behavior instead of simply the imme-
diate or direct effects. 
Prosecutors and state officials will argue that this option presents po-
tential issues for appeals and may overburden police agencies. But, there 
will be no grounds for appeals because Minnesota has decided that there is 
no constitutional obligation to inform defendants of collateral effects. Fur-
thermore, a form which simply lists the options available to one who is 
141. See A.B.A., supra note 6, at Standard 19-2.1 (liThe legislature should collect ... all 
collateral sanctions in a single chapter ... of the jurisdiction's criminal code. The chapter .. . 
should identify with particularity the type, severity and duration of collateral sanctions applicable 
to each offense .... "); see also CriMNet, BACKGROUND CHECKS, supra note 1, at 58. 
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arrested 142 and potential collateral effects of arrests 143 will not present a 
barrier sufficient for preclusion. This option is feasible, necessary, and the 
rewards to society far outweigh any inconveniences. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The increase of accessibility to criminal history records and the de-
crease of protection of those same records through recent court decisions 
have made an arrest record extremely accessible. This record, regardless of 
its disposition, is used by employers and landlords when making hiring and 
housing decisions, and additionally by media, data harvesters, and other 
sources for purposes contradictory to outcomes that would best suit an indi-
vidual. Low-income citizens and disadvantaged minorities, specifically Af-
rican Americans, are arrested in Minnesota at much higher rates than any 
other segment of the population, with many of these arrests resulting in 
cases being dismissed or not charged at all. Unfortunately, the experience 
creates a criminal record that remains available to the pUblic. Our criminal 
justice system is supposed to operate to give individuals a chance at rehabil-
itation, not punish people forever for mistakes. If anyone has ever been 
arrested, regardless of the outcome, he or she should take steps now to 
protect personal information. If immediate steps are not taken to address 
this problem, technology will allow the public to know about one's private 
and highly prejudicial information. 
142. See supra Section IV. 
143. See id. 
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APPENDIX i:'RETURN OF ARREST RECORDS INFORMATION 
What can an individual do to avoid the collateral effects of an ar-
rest record if no charges are filed or the charges are dismissed prior to 
a formal determination of probable cause? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Minnesota offers a procedure that allows an individual the opportunity 
to minimize the collateral consequences of an arrest. This procedure allows 
someone with an arrest record to contact an arresting agency and request 
that the original documents containing the arrest information (not copies of 
the originals) be surrendered so that the public may never access the infor-
mation. Follow the instructions detailed in this document to: 1) determine if 
you are eligible to demand the return of your arrest records; and 2) sign, 
date, and mail the attached "Return of Arrest Records Request" sheet to the 
arresting agency. 
II. ELIGIBILITY 
Before contacting the agency, one must ensure one qualifies: 
First, determine if the charge(s) flowing from your arrest was dis-
missed before a state court officially determined whether there was proba-
ble cause. If probable cause was officially found, then you are ineligible for 
this option. 
Second, determine if you were convicted of a felony or gross misde-
meanor within a ten year period immediately before the arrest. If you were 
convicted of a felony or gross misdemeanor within this period, you are 
ineligible. 
Third, determine if one of the following is true: 
Were the charges dismissed prior to a determination of probable cause; 
or 
Did the prosecuting authority decline to file any charges and did a 
grand jury not return an indictment? 
If the first and second steps, and one of the above conditions, are met, 
then you are eligible to retrieve your arrest record. Now, you need to mail 
the "Return of Arrest Records Request" form in Appendix II to the arresting 
agency. For example, if one is arrested for a crime, and, after one's release, 
the prosecutor dismisses one's charges or declines to file charges because 
the prosecutor or judge concluded that the police officer did not have proba-
ble cause to arrest, and one has not been convicted of a felony or gross 
misdemeanor within ten years prior to one's arrest, then the arrestee need 
only mail the "Return of Arrest Records Request" form in Appendix II to 
the arresting agency. If one does not receive a notification of the dismissal 
of any charge(s) from the arrest or a refusal to file charges notification from 
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the prosecutor or court, one must contact the court or prosecutor to obtain 
this information. Even if your charges are dropped, however, you must 
request the return of your information. 
*** 
In the following situations, an individual would not be able to seek return of 
arrest records, but could petition to have records sealed in an inherent 
power of the court expungement. Certain outcomes that do not apply are: 
The record was sealed under the expungement law after probable cause 
was found; 
The arrested person completed a diversion program; 
The person completed a sentence and was released from incarceration 
with his or her civil rights restored or a pardon was granted; or 
The charges were dismissed after a guilty plea or admission of guilt or 
a stay of adjudication. 
Minn. Stat. § 299C.ll, subd. l(b): 
No petition under chapter 609A is required if the person has not 
been convicted of any felony or gross misdemeanor, either within 
or without the state, within the period of ten years immediately 
preceding the determination of all pending criminal actions or 
proceedings in favor of the arrested person, and either of the fol-
lowing occurred: 
(1) all charges were dismissed prior to a determination of proba-
ble cause; or 
(2) the prosecuting authority declined to file any charges and a 
grand jury did not return an indictment. 
Where these conditions are met, the bureau or agency shall, upon 
demand, return to the arrested person finger and thumb prints, 
photographs, distinctive physical mark identification data, infor-
mation on known aliases and street names, and other identifica-
tion data, and all copies and duplicates of them. 
This form is an optional, non-required, document given at the discretion of 
the arresting agency. Nothing in this document constitutes legal advice nor 
does it provide any basis for appeal. By accepting this document, you agree 
that this document is provided for the sole purpose of informing you about 
some of the options you may have available to you. By accepting this docu-
ment you agree to waive any liability or claims that may arise from this 
form. 
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APPENDIX II: LETTER TO REQUEST RETURN OF ARREST RECORDS 
Att: Records Department 
(Name of a Arresting Agency) 
(Address) 
RE: Return of Arrest Records of: 
First Name Middle Initial Last Name 
Born 1 ____ 1 ______ __ 
Dear Clerk of Records: 
On behalf of born on 
-----------II I , 
(Arrestee's Name) (Date of Birth) 
pursuant to Minn. Stat. 299C.l1, I am requesting that all ORIGINAL "fin-
ger and thumb prints, photographs, distinctive physical mark identification 
data, information on known aliases and street names, and other identifica-
tion data, and all copies and duplicates of them" be returned to 
(Address) 
I attest that _______________ has met all obligations 
(Arrestee's Name) 
required under the statute, including not having been convicted of any fel-
ony or gross misdemeanor, either within or without the state, within the 
period of ten years immediately preceding the determination of all pending 
criminal actions or proceedings in favor of the arrested person, and either of 
the following occurred: (pick one) 
o all charges were dismissed prior to a determination of probable cause; or 
o the prosecuting authority declined to file any charges and a grand jury did 
not return an indictment. Minn. Stat. § 299C.ll. 
The details of the arrestee and the incident are as follows: 
Name: 
Date of Birth: 
Date of Incident: 
Arresting Officer (if known): 
Police Department: 
Description of Incident: 
Please return the ORIGINAL records and not copies to the address pro-
vided so that no copies of the event are ever disseminated. 
